The recent High Court decision of XYZ v Commonwealth ('XYZ') 2 has strengthened the aura of uncertainty surrounding the concept of 'international concern' and its role in widening the application of s 51(xxix) of the Commonwealth Constitution. This article considers the XYZ decision in light of past judicial exegesis and addresses what may lie ahead for this aspect of the external affairs power.
'International concern' has, for some years, hovered as a possible basis for the subject matter of legislation to attract the Commonwealth external affairs power, alongside other grounds such as the implementation of an international convention or recommendation, geographical externality, relations with other countries or customary international law. The head of power relies upon such grounds to colour a piece of Commonwealth legislation with the hue of 'external affairs'. This 'colouring' therefore enables a subject matter to be within the Commonwealth Parliament's legislative competence.
THE FACTS OF XYZ
The XYZ case arose in the context of child sex tourism charges laid against the plaintiff under Part IIIA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 3 The plaintiff was an Australian citizen and was alleged to have committed offences in Thailand in 2001. The legislation operated extraterritorially, targeting sex offences committed by Australian citizens or residents 'while outside Australia' against a person under 16 years of age. However, as the facts themselves demonstrated, the victim of such offences did not have to be Australian. _____________________________________________________________________________________ * Sarah Murray is a Lecturer at the University of Western Australia where she teaches Constitutional Law. The author is indebted to Dr Peter Johnston for his invaluable recommendations on an early draft of this paper. 
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The High Court was asked to consider whether either s 50BA 4 or s 50BC 5 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ('the relevant provisions') were within the scope of s 51(xxix) of the Commonwealth Constitution. A majority of the High Court found that the provisions were constitutionally valid and within the external affairs power, with Callinan and Heydon JJ jointly dissenting.
The case considered a number of aspects of the external affairs power, with much consideration given to the scope of the geographical externality concept which the majority accepted as validating the legislation. 6 This article intends to focus upon the discussion of 'international concern' as a touchstone for the external affairs power and the question mark which clings to this concept.
HOW THE XYZ COOKIE CRUMBLED
Amongst other arguments, the Commonwealth submitted that the prevention of abuse and exploitation of children amounted to a matter of 'international concern' and brought the relevant provisions within the scope of the external affairs power. This characterisation was said to be supported by a number of international endeavours, including the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by the United Nations in 1989, 7 the accompanying Optional Protocol in May 2000, 8 the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography as well as the existence of legislation in over 30 countries worldwide targeting inappropriate sexual behaviour committed extraterritorially. It was therefore argued that the relevant provisions dealt with a subject matter that was sufficiently 'relevant to Australia's relationships with other nation states, and with relevant international organisations', to be of 'international concern'. 9 As the majority of the Court accepted the Commonwealth's submissions that the relevant provisions were supported by other aspects of the external affairs power (namely, geographical externality) its submissions in relation to 'international concern' did not have to be conclusively addressed. However, several comments were made by the Court in relation to the latter 'unsettled' 10 principle.
One common theme expressed by the bench was a sense of trepidation regarding the limitless subject matter that could fit under the expanding 'international concern' umbrella. 11 Gleeson CJ indicated that the concept of 'international concern' had the potential to push Australia's legislative capacity beyond Australia's assumed obligations, but that it was questionable whether the raising of an issue at an international forum could, on its own, cast a subject as being of 'international concern'. 12 Kirby J reflected that there was a risk that it could encompass a 'diverse multitude of topics lacking any precise definition or meaning'. 13 His Honour referred to the plaintiff's contention that an expression as broad as 'international concern' would fail to provide an adequate litmus test for Commonwealth legislation and that the phrase would need to be narrowed by words such as '"real", "genuine", "widespread", "pressing", "established", or "undisputed"'. 14 Alternatively, the plaintiff referred to the need for qualifications such as the existence of a 'nexus between Australia and the supposed subject of external affairs' or the inclusion of a proportionality requirement. 15 The joint judgment of Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ referred briefly to the concept and its role in Commonwealth v Tasmania 16 and Polyukhovich v Commonwealth 17 but determined that the case did not require that the unresolved aspects of 'international concern' be addressed. 18 The dissenting judgment of Callinan and Heydon JJ asserted that there was no established authority for the concept of 'international concern' and that the existing insubstantial obiter dicta fell short of establishing concrete boundaries for the phrase. 19 Their Honours referred to the Federal Court decision of Soulitopoulos v La Trobe University Liberal Club 20 as an example of the potential unworkability of the concept because the constitutional validity of legislation might vary depending on the status of the relevant subject matter in the international sphere at a particular point in time. 21 Their Honours stated that its 'volatility' and 'elusiveness' 'strongly suggest that the international concern doctrine does not exist; for if it did, it would operate antithetically to the rule of law.' 22 Especially problematic was how the existence of sufficient 'concern' within the international community could be established, 23 particularly, in the context of the 'fuzzy' zone where there is no treaty negotiated on the matter. 24 What could be said to render a particular subject of 'international concern' when the 'opinions of national governments' and citizens vary? 25 Callinan and Heydon JJ pondered what workable boundaries could be adopted to avoid the Commonwealth Parliament obtaining carte blanche through the means of a 'plenary' interpretation. 26 They emphasised the difficulty of introducing a proportionality cap, when, in contradistinction to international conventions, there would not be much substance from which to draw the 'appropriate and adapted' boundary. 27 wide application of 'international concern' could have resulted in the opposite result in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth 28 on the basis of the level of international distress surrounding the 'red terror'. 29 These apprehensions prompted Callinan and Heydon JJ to conclude that:
One solution…would be to reject the existence of "international concern" not reflected in treaties as a basis for s 51(xxix) validity… There are immense difficulties facing any court wishing to recognise, as a matter of decision, the international concern doctrine. 30
In any event, even if the concept was to apply, their Honours determined that it would not assist in establishing the validity of the relevant provisions which were directed at victims under 16. This was because much of the international legislation used by the Commonwealth to demonstrate 'international concern' only applied to conduct directed at children under the age of 12 and was therefore narrower in its application than the relevant provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 31
'INTERNATIONAL CONCERN' 32 -THE JOURNEY TO XYZ
If on shaky ground after XYZ, what has been the constitutional history of the concept of 'international concern' and how entrenched are its roots? Its history has been complicated. As Callinan and Heydon JJ observed, the concept 'potentially narrow[s] s 51(xxix) so far as it depends on treaties' but then 'is said to widen s 51(xxix) where no treaty can be relied on'. 33 In the XYZ decision, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ trace the phrase 'international concern' back to Willoughby's 1910 work, The Constitutional Law of the States. 34 Certainly, the phrase had entered the High Court vernacular by the 1930s with Latham CJ stating in R v Burgess; Ex Parte Henry that '[n]o one would to-day be inclined to deny that the production and sale of recently invented narcotic drugs is a matter of international interest and concern'. 35 In Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen, 36 Stephen J, in considering the validity of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (RDA) famously pronounced that '[a] subject-matter of international concern necessarily possesses the capacity to affect a country's relations with other nations and this quality is itself enough to make a subject-matter a part of a nation's "external affairs"'. 37 He was of the view that the topic of racial discrimination had become a sufficient head of 'international concern' to enable the RDA to be within the external affairs power and that the existence of a treaty would not itself suffice. 38 Mason J in that case was of the view that a 'matter' of 'external concern' could, by forming part 'of international debate, discussion and negotiation', come within s 51(xxix) even prior to the existence of a treaty. 39 For Mason J, the decision to enter into a treaty merely 'evidences the existence of international concern'. 40 Murphy J took a similar approach and did not think that the existence of a treaty was essential when the subject-matter constituted a matter of 'international concern', which on the facts could be found in 'the observance in Australia of international standards of human rights'. 41 The contrary view was expressed by Gibbs CJ, who was concerned that if s 51(xxix) applied upon ratification of a Convention or on the basis of 'international concern' the workings of federalism would be compromised. 42 The concept of 'international concern' was further developed less than a decade later in Polyukhovich. 43 The case saw Brennan and Toohey JJ discuss 'international concern' as an independent touchstone for the external affairs power while determining the constitutional validity of the War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth). The legislation targeted war crimes committed outside Australia during the Second World War and made such crimes offences under Australian law.
Brennan J recognised the inherently nebulous nature of 'international concern' and the reality that a 'multitude of topics' could come within its grasp by impacting on Australia's foreign relations even when they fell short of being unequivocal 'obligations'. 44 In seeking to limit the scope of the 'international concern' limb, Brennan J identified that: unless standards are broadly adhered to or are likely to be broadly adhered to in international practice and unless those standards are expressed in terms which clearly state the expectation of the community of nations, the subject of those standards cannot be described as a true matter of international concern…It would be erroneous to attribute a scope to the external affairs power which depended on the broadest meaning which could be given to the imprecise phrase "international concern": that phrase is not a constitutional text… 45 On this basis, his Honour concluded that there was insufficient 'international concern' at the time to bring the War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth) offence within the scope of the external affairs power. 46 This conclusion was reached on the basis that 
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Further support for 'international concern' as an independent limb (as distinct from being considered an aspect of the treaty dimension of external affairs) can also be drawn from the majority judgments in the Tasmanian Dam Case. 47 For Murphy J, even sufficient concern emerging within scientific circles might attract the external affairs label. 48 His Honour also gave the example of concern internationally in relation to 'human rights violations' as 'often extend[ing] internal affairs to external affairs'. 49 Both Brennan J 50 and Deane J 51 referred to the pertinence of grounds such as 'international concern' in contexts in which binding obligations are not present. Deane J did however express the limitation that legislation must still be sufficiently proportionate. 52 On the other hand, the concept of 'international concern' has resulted in significant 'divisions' on the bench. 53 Mason J in the Tasmanian Dam Case stated that:
The fact that the power may extend to the subject matter of the treaty before it is made or adopted by Australia, because the subject matter has become a matter of international concern to Australia, does not mean that Parliament may depart from the provisions of the treaty after it has been entered into by Australia and enact legislation which goes beyond the treaty or is inconsistent with it. 54 Professor Rothwell later asserted that 'it cannot always be said…that international treaties truly represent existing international concern on certain subject matters' because of the compromises necessary to achieve unanimity. 55 This dilemma is evident in the different view of Mason J in the Tasmanian Dam Case 56 (set out above) to that later expressed by Dawson J in Richardson v Forestry Commission. 57 Dawson J expressed doubt that, if 'international concern' was found to exist in relation to a topic, a treaty on a particular element of that topic should 'place outside the external affairs power that part of the subject matter which is beyond the limits of the treaty'. 58 Moreover, his Honour was sceptical that legislation would not be stamped with the flavour of external affairs when it was previously within the domain of 'international concern' if a more tapered convention is later crafted on that subject. 59 The position taken by Dawson J is consistent with his alignment with the minority in the Tasmanian Dam Case who followed Stephen J's approach in Koowarta, 60 requiring 'international concern' rather than simply the existence of a treaty.
In Richardson Dawson J did indicate that the scope of 'international concern' was ever expanding and questioned whether some limits were necessary. 61 His Honour once again expressed disquiet at the wide meaning of 'international concern' in Victoria v Commonwealth. 62 After citing Brennan J's statement in Polyukhovich set out above, 63 Dawson J indicated that 'according to Brennan J…the only way in which international concern may ordinarily be established is by reference to standards which are obligatory or tantamount to obligatory in international law'. 64 Dawson J suggested that with this unique construction of 'international concern', a Convention would 'provide the evidence, not only of international concern, but also of the extent of international concern'. 65 He concluded that:
[t]he touchstone of the external affairs power should be externality, not international concern. And if a law does exhibit the characteristic of externality, it should not matter whether the law implements a treaty or not. 66 The history of 'international concern' has been plagued both by the continuing expansion of the concept and the inherent difficulty in crafting clear guidelines for this aspect of the Commonwealth's external affairs power. Different judges have inconsistently looked to 'international concern' and, when they have done so, have adopted varied interpretations of the concept. Further, it is yet to be applied by a majority of the Court as the sole justification for the validity of a law within s 51(xxix). Many queries remain regarding the future of the concept. Can a piece of Commonwealth legislation cease to be supported by the external affairs power when its subject matter falls out of favour as a matter of 'international concern' and there is no other external affairs grounding? 67 What is to be the role for 'international concern' within the external affairs power? Is it possible to define the concept of 'international concern' in a more meaningful way or does its past record require its abandonment?
ARE WE BACK TO ABC AFTER XYZ?
Following its chequered history and the most recent judicial statements in XYZ there is a real question as to whether the ship of 'international concern' is sinking fast without there being much commiseration at its demise. The issue is whether greater substance can be given to the 'international concern' concept to save it from its 'immense difficulties' 68 and repeatedly pronounced indeterminacy. In XYZ, Kirby J expressed unequivocally that, although some constitutional limits were essential, the Commonwealth Parliament should not have its wings clipped to such a degree that it is prevented from legislating, to the 'extent' possible for other countries, 'with respect to matters of international concern'. 69 Although not needing to finally decide, his Honour emphasised that some parameters needed to be put in place for this 'undeveloped concept', 70 namely, that such a law must fall within the scope of s51(xxix), be consistent with the Commonwealth Constitution, as well as the federalist enterprise. 71 The key questions which remain for the concept of 'international concern' are, firstly, is the concept productive? If so, what aspects need to be tweaked to address its 'undeveloped' 72 nature?
Clearly, the concept of 'international concern' is not self-sufficient and has a role only within the external affairs sphere. 73 Whether the concept is required depends primarily on the necessary scope of the Federal Parliament's legislative competence. 74 In terms of its utility, Brennan J spoke in Polyukhovich 75 of the Commonwealth Constitution assisting Australia 'to take its place among the nations of the world' and the need for the government to be able to pass legislation to comply:
with standards expected of and by the community of nations, even though those standards are not, or have not achieved the status of, obligations in international law. The observation of those standards may rightly be regarded as a matter of international concern...it is used to indicate that the power relates to matters affecting Australia's external relations even if those matters are not obligations under international law. 76 When the scope of the external affairs power already seems to encompass areas such as treaty implementation, international recommendations and resolutions, geographical externality, relations with other countries and possibly customary international law, what work is left for the concept of 'international concern'? Frequently, there will be an overlap in the external affairs grounds used to support legislation, with 'international concern' often used as an auxiliary ground. 77 Are there some issues that Australian citizens would expect the Commonwealth to address by legislation which would not fall under any limb other than 'international concern'? Does 'international concern' add a vital ingredient to the s 51(xxix) pot? It is submitted that there is potentially work for 'international concern' to do within the external affairs head. 78 79 From such issues may stem the expectation both at home and even overseas that the legislature acts pre-emptively. The environment is likely to be a source of 'international concern' when scientific advancements may mean that international obligations fail to keep step with 'burning international issue[s]'. 80 How does 'international concern' compare with the 'relations with other countries' base? Is 'international concern' an unnecessary duplication following R v Sharkey 81 and Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 1)? 82 Even if the 'relations with other countries' head were extended beyond relationships with other states to relationships with other international bodies such as the United Nations, 83 there would still, it is suggested, be room for 'international concern'. 84 It would simply depend on whether, in the first instance, the emphasis of the subject matter was on the international relationship or the issue itself. Admittedly, either starting point could potentially lead indirectly to, or have implications for, the other. This could be read into the comment made by Stephen J in Koowarta that 'international concern necessarily possesses the capacity to affect a country's relations with other nations'. 85 For example, legislation on the topic of extraordinary renditions, could, depending on the circumstances, form the subject of legislation either on the basis of a relevant bipartite state relationship or from the rendition debate generally. The latter debate is likely to impact upon international relationships but the relationship may not be sufficiently connected with the legislation at the outset. 86 Alternatively, considerable international debate regarding greenhouse gas emissions may result in Commonwealth legislation introducing a carbon trading scheme. In the absence of binding obligations, this would be likely attract the 'international concern' label rather than instinctively align with the 'relations with other countries' limb, although international linkages and comparable schemes may still inform the methods adopted.
The problem is that 'international concern' has often been confusingly defined as feeding back into the 'relations with other countries' ground. 87 This has meant that a topic is of 'international concern' if it has the potential to impact on Australia's international relations. It is submitted that this has impeded the ability of the concept to find a home for itself within the external affairs rubric. Certainly, Professor Zines has defined the 'relations with other countries' head as referring to laws which relate to _____________________________________________________________________________________ an area that is vague and difficult to apply. If there are no differences, no advantage is to be gained by jettisoning the formulation'.
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Joseph and Castan, above n 67,127. the 'subject' of 'relations between Australia and other governments'. 88 On this basis, 'international concern' can be distinguished from the 'relations with other countries' ground. Legislation on topics such as sedition, 89 extradition 90 and foreign legislation 91 could clearly then be differentiated from subjects which may affect international associations but do not themselves address overseas relations. 92 A precise definition of 'international concern' seems to have eluded the courts. Even if it is determined that 'international concern' has some utility, the uncertainty of the concept has always been its greatest shortcoming. Its inherent elasticity has meant that it has been stretched and applied in such different ways that its usefulness is now being questioned.
If considered useful, it is vital that a more structured identity be adopted for 'international concern'. Potentially, Brennan J's approach in Polyukhovich 93 could be the concept's saviour. 94 His Honour referred to the importance of 'standards expected of and by the community of nations' which 'clearly state the expectation of the community of nations' and which are 'broadly adhered to in international practice'. 95 For Brennan J these constitute non-negotiable elements for the 'subject of those standards' to be 'true matter[s] of international concern' 96 'even though those standards are not, or have not yet achieved the status of, obligations in international law'. 97 The approach of Brennan J, in seeking some level of predictability and specificity in the application of the concept of 'international concern' can, broadly, be paralleled with the procedural steps necessary to establish the formation of a rule of customary international law. 98 On the facts of Polyukhovich, in the absence of an international 'obligation', there was a need for clear 'standards' and 'material' relating to the 'bringing to trial and punishment of war criminals' to establish the requisite 'international concern' to justify prosecution outside established 'international tribunals' or the countries directly affected . 99 (1991) 172 CLR 501, 561-2. On the facts, Brennan J concluded that the evidence was 'insufficient…to show that the apprehension and trial of such war criminals before courts
